The Sirius backdoor reaches its victims through a PDF. FileDNA CADR can stop it at that point. It removes the PDF’s launch action before the file reaches the user. The attachment is the critical intervention point. If the document cannot start PowerShell, the rest of the infection chain never begins.

How the attack works
Trellix described the campaign on October 26, 2026. Symantec also issued a protection bulletin on it. Trellix investigated one corporate case in South Korea.
The chain runs in seven steps:
- The email. Attackers pose as FedEx Billing Online and write in Korean. The message demands payment of a 217,740 KRW tax invoice by a deadline. The deadline pushes the recipient to act fast.
- The archive. The email carries
Fedex_tax_receipt.zip, about 205 KB. The ZIP helps the PDF slip past email gateway scanners. - The PDF. Inside the ZIP is
Fedex_tax_receipt.pdf. The page is blank. The file exists only to run code. An/OpenActionentry triggers a/Launchaction. That action starts a hidden, Base64-encoded PowerShell command. - The user’s click. The PDF reader shows a security prompt. The attack works only if the victim approves it. This is social engineering, not a zero-click exploit.
- In-memory stages. PowerShell decrypts a .NET loader stored inside the PDF. The loader runs only in memory. A second stage disables Windows event tracing (ETW).
- The download. The second stage downloads the final payload,
zeus.dat, from a domain in the United Arab Emirates. - The backdoor. Sirius is injected into a trusted Windows process such as
msbuild.exeorsvchost.exe.
Sirius gives the attacker remote access. It steals browser logins and records keystrokes. It can capture the webcam and microphone. It swaps cryptocurrency wallet addresses in the clipboard. It survives reboots through Run keys, scheduled tasks, startup shortcuts and recovery folders. Trellix links it to the commercial SiriusQT RAT family. No threat actor has been named.
Why the attachment is the intervention point
Most of Sirius runs in memory. The delivery still depends on a file. The PDF is the bridge from an email attachment to operating-system commands.
The file boundary is the last point before execution. Break the bridge there, and none of the in-memory stages ever start.
How FileDNA CADR breaks the chain
Content Analysis, Disarm and Reconstruction (CADR) belongs at this boundary. FileDNA would handle the Sirius attachment in four steps:
- Open the archive. FileDNA extracts the PDF from the ZIP.
- Analyze the PDF. It finds the
/OpenActionentry and the/Launchaction. - Disarm it. Under a policy that removes executable PDF actions, both are dropped. The encoded PowerShell command has nothing left to trigger it.
- Reconstruct and report. FileDNA rebuilds the permitted content into a clean PDF. It writes a report that lists what it removed and why.
In this case, the page was blank. There is little content to preserve. The report still matters. It tells the SOC that a launch action was removed from an invoice-themed PDF.
What the deployment must cover
CADR protects only the files that pass through it. The full delivery path matters.
| Requirement | What it means |
|---|---|
| Archives | Files inside ZIPs must reach the inspection engine. |
| Encrypted content | Some Trellix notes describe the ZIP as password-protected. FileDNA cannot inspect what it cannot open. Encrypted or unreadable files need an explicit policy: hold, block or route for review. They must never pass as clean. |
| Timing | The processed version must reach the user before the original. The user must receive the reconstructed file, not the attachment. |
| The original | If the original stays accessible in the mailbox or a download folder, a user can still open it. Retain it only in restricted evidence storage. |
What this assessment does not claim
This article identifies the prevention point from the published attack chain. It is not a completed FileDNA test against the Sirius sample.
A validation test should confirm two results. Reconstruction removes the launch action. PowerShell can no longer start through that mechanism.
CADR is one layer, not the whole defense. Endpoint monitoring is still needed for infections that have already run. Trellix recommends several endpoint controls:
| Control | Action |
|---|---|
| Attack surface reduction | Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes (Microsoft Defender ASR rule). |
| PowerShell hardening | Enforce Constrained Language Mode and log PowerShell script blocks. |
| Process alerts | Alert when a PDF reader starts PowerShell, or when unusual processes launch msbuild.exe or svchost.exe. |
| Persistence audit | Audit recovery and setup folders for unexpected persistence files. |
FileDNA CSL across business workflows
FileDNA, as a Content Security Layer (CSL), applies the same approach wherever files enter a business:
| Product | Where it works |
|---|---|
| FileDNA Desktop | Processes files on endpoints |
| FileDNA Server | Protects mail flow, file shares and upload pipelines |
| FileDNA Cloud | Provides API-based processing |
| FileDNA Relay | Brings attachment processing into mail platforms |
| FileDNA App | Supports messaging workflows |
| FileDNA Core | Embeds CADR in other software |
| FileDNA Connect | Links FileDNA with security platforms |
| FileDNA Guard | Places checks ahead of AI agents |
| FileDNA Airlock | Processes files on an isolated USB device |
For Sirius, Server and Relay are the most direct fit, since the attack arrives by email. Connect can send the processing report to the SOC.
All of these products share one ability. They analyze, disarm and reconstruct supported content before a person or system uses it.